Blog by Vincent Tournebize, Head of Dods French Monitoring Service
On the evening of the first round of the 2024 legislative elections, a familiar concept re-emerged in the public debate: “Republican Barrier,” Front Républicain (Republican Front), or “Anti-Far-Right Barrier.” These terms all convey a shared urgency: the need to unite political forces, from the far left to the traditional right, to counter the growing influence of the Rassemblement National (RN). While this tactic succeeded in keeping the RN from taking power, it failed to establish a stable government. Paradoxically, Marine Le Pen’s popularity appears stronger than ever.
This text examines the relevance of the Front Républicain in France. What objectives does this strategy pursue? Are these goals achievable? And finally, could the Front Républicain exacerbate the very situation it seeks to combat?
From 1956 to 2024: The Evolution of the Republican Front
In France, under the Fifth Republic, the term Front Républicain refers to a coalition of multiple political parties formed to block the rise of the National Front (FN), now known as the Rassemblement National (RN), considered a far-right party opposed to republican values. The concept has roots in alliances dating back to the Third Republic, most notably the Front Républicain of 1956.
The second round of the 2002 presidential election marked the pinnacle of this strategy. All political parties, excluding the FN, called for a vote in favour of Jacques Chirac, who secured nearly 82% of the vote against Jean-Marie Le Pen. However, over the years, the credibility of the Front Républicain has waned as the FN, under Marine Le Pen, steadily gained momentum.
This strategy made a dramatic comeback during the 2024 legislative elections. In response to the RN’s success in the European elections in May and its impressive first-round results in the legislative elections, the parties of the Nouveau Front Populaire (NFP) and the presidential majority agreed to withdraw candidates in favour of those best positioned to defeat RN candidates, thereby preventing the RN from achieving an absolute majority. However, Les Républicains (LR) and some figures from the presidential majority chose not to fully participate in this strategy, even though they benefited electorally from it.
2024: A Paradoxical Revival of the Front Républicain
One of the clearest outcomes of the 2024 legislative elections was the rejection of RN governance by two-thirds of voters. Additionally, despite deep divisions, the forces comprising the Front Républicain held a majority in the National Assembly, with 425 deputies when including La France Insoumise (LFI) and LR, and 307 without them—well above the majority threshold of 289 seats.
Yet, no Front Républicain government emerged. The primary reason lies in the strategy of the President of the Republic, who refused to support such an alliance, fearing it might challenge his major economic reforms, including pension reform and the abolition of certain taxes.
Furthermore, a coalition of such breadth risked reinforcing the RN’s role as the main opposition, feeding its narrative of a “single-party system” or the “UM-PS system.” The example of Italy illustrates this risk: in 2021–2022, Giorgia Meloni successfully capitalized on her refusal to join Mario Draghi’s coalition, which ultimately paved the way for her electoral victory.
A Short-Term Fix with Long-Term Risks
While the Front Républicain demonstrated electoral effectiveness in 2024, it also revealed its limitations. It appears more as a reactive measure than a sustainable political strategy.
For the left, the Front Républicain often serves as a unifying tool. As Paris Socialist Mayor Anne Hidalgo stated in 2021, “The left has always played the Front Républicain.” This concept has allowed the left to maintain a significant presence, whether through formal alliances or through “strategic voting” dynamics, as seen in the 2017 and 2022 presidential elections.
For other components of the Front Républicain, the concept is more ambiguous. It can signify a fight for republican values but also point to electoral tactics aimed at preserving seats and influence. This recalls the Apparentement regime under the Fourth Republic, a system of electoral alliances that contributed to political instability.
Finally, the Front Républicain highlights the lack of political responses to the RN. The RN continues to gain ground by addressing voter concerns such as immigration, security, and purchasing power. Paradoxically, instead of rallying citizens to its original platform, the RN seems to adapt to the preferences of the majority, as highlighted by Michaël Foessel and Étienne Ollion in Une étrange victoire: L’extrême droite contre la politique (Seuil). On issues like leaving the European Union, abandoning the euro, or enshrining abortion rights in the constitution, the far-right party often aligns with public opinion rather than holding firm to its original positions.
The Fifth Republic at Risk: Lessons from the Apparentement Regime
The resurgence of the Front Républicain during the 2024 legislative elections invites comparisons with the Apparentement regime under the Fourth Republic. This system of electoral alliances allowed parties to present independent candidates while pooling their votes for seat allocation. Its primary aim was to marginalize both the French Communist Party (PCF) and General de Gaulle’s party (RPF) within the National Assembly.
Ultimately, the Apparentement regime exacerbated parliamentary instability and lack of representativeness by encouraging fragmented and short-lived majorities. This instability was one of the main reasons for the collapse of the Fourth Republic in 1958, paving the way for the more presidential Fifth Republic. A similar fate may await the Fifth Republic, as 56% of French citizens now declare they no longer want it.