On 7 September 2026, Kemi Badenoch, the Leader of the Conservative Party, reshuffled her Shadow Cabinet, updating her frontbench to match the new Prime Minister, Andy Burnham’s, new Cabinet. Among the appointments, Tom Tugendhat was promoted to Shadow Foreign Secretary, replacing Dame Priti Patel.
This appointment brings one of the Conservative Party’s most outspoken voices on foreign affairs and national security back to the frontbench. As such, Tugendhat’s appointment could mark an important development in the Conservative Party’s approach to foreign affairs under Badenoch.
After two years in opposition, Badenoch’s Conservatives have yet to develop a distinct and/or cohesive approach to foreign and defence policy. Given this new appointment, could Tom Tugendhat help the Conservatives develop a foreign policy position unique to Badenoch’s leadership, offering a coherent alternative to the current Labour Government’s position?
Who is Tom Tugendhat?
Thomas Georg John Tugendhat, usually referred to as Tom Tugendhat, was first elected as an MP in 2015, winning the Tonbridge and Malling seat for the Conservatives after sitting Conservative MP Sir John Stanley stood down.
In 2017, Tugendhat became Chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee, a role he held until 2022. In 2022, he ran for the Conservative Party leadership for the first time, but was eliminated before the final contest between Liz Truss and Rishi Sunak. He later became Minister of State for Security in the Home Office under Truss, keeping the role under Sunak until the Conservatives lost the 2024 general election. He then served briefly as Shadow Security Minister before standing down to run for the Conservative leadership for a second time.
Prior to his political career, Tugendhat worked as a journalist, management consultant and energy analyst after graduating from the University of Cambridge. He subsequently joined the British Army, serving as a Territorial Army officer and an Arabic-speaking intelligence officer in Iraq. He also served in Afghanistan, including work supporting the establishment of the Afghan National Security Council. In 2009, he returned to the UK to contribute to the Strategic Defence and Security Review as part of the Army Strategy Team. In 2010, Tugendhat became Military Assistant and Principal Adviser to the Chief of the Defence Staff, a position he held until 2013.
What Issue Areas Will Tugendhat Focus On?
Tugendhat’s official responsibilities will focus on foreign affairs, but he has also reportedly been tasked with “amplifying the Conservatives’ message on defence”.
James Cartlidge will remain Shadow Defence Secretary, but Tugendhat’s additional role could aim to use his military career and experience in national security as a legitimising force for Conservative defence rhetoric.
Upon accepting the appointment, Tugendhat stated:
“We’re facing the most dangerous moment in a generation. Too often, the Government has responded with weakness. As shadow foreign secretary, I’ll ensure Britain chooses strength again.”
His appointment also gives the Conservatives an opportunity to challenge the Government’s approach to international engagement. Since taking office, Prime Minister Andy Burnham has placed considerable emphasis on domestic priorities, including economic growth, public services and regional development. Tugendhat could sharpen the contrast by pressing a more outward-facing agenda.
In terms of his likely areas of focus, Tugendhat has been particularly outspoken on China and Iran, repeatedly arguing for a stronger British response to the security challenges both countries pose.
As such, China is likely to become one of Tugendhat’s principal areas of focus. He has long been considered one of Parliament’s most prominent China sceptics, criticising Beijing’s human rights record, its treatment of Uyghur Muslims, and the potential security risks posed by Chinese influence in the UK. In March 2021, Tugendhat was among several British parliamentarians sanctioned by Beijing following criticism of China’s human rights record. More recently, he has campaigned against plans for China’s new ‘mega-embassy’ in London, describing its approval as a “grave mistake”.
Furthermore, he confirmed his decision to return to the Conservative frontbench while visiting Taiwan, where he was meeting officials to discuss the threat posed by China.
Case Study: The China Audit
On 24 June 2025, the UK Government announced the completion of its ‘China Audit’, which aimed to establish a long-term strategy for the UK’s relationship with China.
The review was one of several the Starmer Government initiated upon taking office in 2024, intended to clarify how, where, and why the UK should engage with China, while providing greater certainty for British businesses engaged in international trade.
The Government’s position sought to balance economic engagement with national security concerns, maintaining opportunities for trade and investment while recognising the risks posed by Chinese state activity. Then-Foreign Secretary David Lammy stated that the approach would move UK-China relations “beyond cheap rhetoric to a data-driven, cross-government approach”. However, the full audit was never made public beyond a heavily redacted document that offers little clarity towards the Government’s approach.
Tugendhat’s appointment could make challenging this approach a significant Conservative priority, helping the party distinguish its foreign policy priorities from the Labour Government.
Defence and International Security
Alongside his hawkish approach to China, Tugendhat’s military background could also shape the Conservatives’ approach to defence and international security.
His experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, alongside his previous work on defence strategy, gives him a background that could support a more integrated approach to international engagement, while offering the Conservative perspective increased legitimacy due to his veteran status.
This has been reflected at Conservative Party Conference 2026 (CPC26), where Tugendhat and Cartlidge spoke as part of an ‘Our plan to defend Britain in a more dangerous world’ keynote section, rather than delivering individual speeches. Their contributions linked the Conservatives’ foreign policy priorities, particularly the threats posed by Russia, China and Iran, with the need to strengthen Britain’s military capabilities and national security. This keynote section also saw the Conference’s most significant defence announcement; the £10bn ‘Britannia Shield’ shared by Cartlidge and other shadow ministers, including Tughendhat.
During this session Helen Whately, Shadow Work and Pensions Secretary, Alex Burghart, Shadow Northern Ireland Secretary, also spoke alongside Ukrainian MP Yehor Cherniev and historian Niall Ferguson. This further emphasised how the Conservatives wished to link national security, defence and foreign policy – interrelating the national with the international.
From Reactive to Rehearsed
Kemi Badenoch’s term as leader of the Conservative Party began with a promise not to rush into making policy ahead of the next general election. To some extent, she has upheld this approach, particularly in foreign affairs and defence policy.
During the first two years of this parliamentary session, the Conservative Party did not put forward a concrete and distinctive foreign policy platform. Instead, it largely pursued reactive politics in response to the day’s international issues, and much the same can be said for its defence policy.
This led to a focus on the Chagos Islands, particularly after the UK Government announced the financial arrangements for transferring sovereignty to Mauritius – despite the fact that the previous Conservative Government initiated these negotiations. Likewise, the party focused on maintaining a balanced approach to the conflict in Gaza, prioritising humanitarian support for Palestinians while preserving a positive relationship with Israel.
Former Shadow Foreign Secretary Priti Patel also frequently emphasised the importance of maintaining a close relationship with the United States, at one point suggesting that the UK should consider joining its ally in military action against Iran to prevent the country from acquiring nuclear weapons.
On defence, Cartlidge focused on skills and employment, increasing defence spending and accelerating procurement. While specific issues arose, including the decommissioning of naval capabilities and delays to the Defence Investment Plan, the Conservative Party’s overall approach to defence policy remained relatively disparate and indistinct.
This conference season, however, has been different.
At CPC26, the party announced plans for a £10bn ‘Britannia Shield’, an integrated air and missile defence system intended to protect military bases and critical national infrastructure against drone and missile attacks. This announcement builds on the recently announced commitment to create a £50bn Sovereign Defence Fund, to increase British Army numbers and to introduce Tax-Free Reserve Service.
Furthermore, the Conservatives committed in early September to spending 3 percent of GDP on defence by 2030, something the Labour Government has yet to do. This marks a shift from criticising Government defence spending and procurement delays to presenting a specific alternative for future defence investment.
Looking to the 2029 General Election
Therefore, Tugendhat’s appointment could offer significant utility to Kemi Badenoch, helping to establish a more clearly defined approach to foreign and defence policy.
Following the Conservative Party’s significant defeat at the last general election and losses in subsequent local elections, Badenoch faces the challenge of demonstrating to both her party and the electorate how her leadership differs from that her of predecessor Rishi Sunak. Tugendhat’s military experience and strong interests in China and national security, alongside more concrete policy announcements, could help distinguish the Conservatives under Badenoch from previous party leadership, and differentiate them from electoral competitors like Labour and Reform UK.
While the Conservatives will have to make policy in all areas to convince the electorate that they should be the next Government, foreign affairs and defence are two areas of where there has been significant confusion over what the party stands for.
Previous Conservative Governments have pursued vastly different approaches to engaging China, one example of which was Prime Minister Theresa May approving the Huawei 5G contract and Prime Minister Boris Johnson then cancelling it. While the Conservatives have traditionally positioned themselves as strong supporters of defence spending, their 14 years in government saw some of the most significant reductions in British military personnel and capabilities since the end of the Cold War. Between 2010 and 2024, the UK Armed Forces lost approximately 50,000 full-time personnel, while the 2010 Strategic Defence and Security Review initiated a programme of substantial spending cuts, including a planned 7.5 percent real-terms reduction in the defence budget over four years.
When it comes to the war in Gaza, the Sunak Government’s position also evolved, initially emphasising Israel’s right to defend itself following the 7 October 2023 attacks, before increasingly calling for humanitarian assistance, a sustainable ceasefire and a political settlement. By January 2024, then Foreign Secretary David Cameron had even suggested that the UK could consider recognising a Palestinian state.
There is clearly room to be more definitive about what voting Conservative would mean for British foreign policy.
What is more, foreign policy played a notable role in the 2024 General Election, with 21 percent of British Muslim voters identifying the Israel–Palestine conflict as their single most important electoral issue, while 12 percent of voters nationally identified defence and foreign affairs among their three highest political priorities. The significance of the Israel–Palestine conflict was further reflected in the election of five independent MPs who prominently campaigned on the issue.
Combining these matters, there is a clear motivating force behind developing a distinct and ubiquitous foreign policy agenda, not just for the Conservative Party, but specifically for Kemi Badenoch’s Conservative Party.
In the wake of the Conservative Party Conference 2026, it now appears the party will place greater emphasis on establishing a coherent foreign affairs and defence policy platform.
As Parliament returns from recess, the stage is set to see whether the conference’s momentum and the frontbench change will truly lead to a new Conservative Party approach that stands unique against the competition. Whether Tugendhat can deliver this distinction will be an important test of Badenoch’s efforts to present the Conservatives as a credible alternative government.